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1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss the use of the Hamblin/Mackenzie
Formal  Dialectic  (HMFD)  for  the  classical/non-classical
debate about the status of contradictions and of non-trival
inconsistent  theories.  Some  of  the  central  issues  have
been addressed in (Mackenzie and Priest 1990), and we
discuss their stance.
It  will  be  argued  that  the  Mackenzie-Priest  stance  poses  difficulties  for  the
classical viewpoint. These are difficulties which have to do with debating the
questions. In a discussion of the difficulties about the debate, argument will be
presented  which  is  deeply  pessimistic  about  the  resolution  of  these  debate
difficulties. The question for us is, “How can the argument continue? Can such
profound difference be amenable to rational or reasonable argument?”
We begin by setting out a HMFD system in a condensed form, with focus on the
features which are salient to the question of the debate. The system contains
certain restrictions which are classical in nature. These restrictions give HMFD
an apparently strong bias against dialetheism.
We consider how the HMFD restrictions work in practice, and see if they need to
be modified so as to better serve the debate about dialetheism without begging
the question. In this context, we consider some comments of (John Woods 1997)
about both the argument against disjunctive syllogism and the well known set
theory paradox in the Russell-Frege correspondence.
The comments were made in response to a dialogue system presented in (Girle
“Belief Sets and Commitment Stores” 1997).
2. Hamblin/Mackenzie Formal Dialectic (HMFD)
There are many formal dialogue systems. (We note in passing: Barth and Martens
1984,  Hamblin  1970,  Mackenzie  1979,  1984,  Walton  1984,  and  Walton  and
Krabbe 1995.) Despite differences between the systems, they have several things
in common.
There are four main elements in most dialogue-logics. First, there is interaction
between dialogue participants – the minimal case being two participants. The
interaction is represented in the obvious way as a sequence of locution events.
The  dialogue-logic  also  has  syntactic  stipulations  concerning  the  types  of
locutions  with  which  the  logic  will  deal.  The  locutions  include:  statements,
responses of various sorts, questions of various kinds, and withdrawals. Locutions
are used by the participants in a dialogue to form a sequence of locution events.
In setting out a dialogue we number locutions to indicate their  order in the
dialogue. These numbers are somewhat like the numberings of formulas in a
proof.
The second element is a set of commitment stores, one for each participant in the
sequence.  Commitment  stores  are  neither  deductively  closed  nor  necessarily
logically consistent. The third element is a set of Commitment Store Rules. Each
participant’s commitment store is added to and subtracted from according to
what statements, questions, answers and withdrawals are used by participants in
the dialogue, subject only to the rules. For example, there may be a rule that if a
participant asserts that P, then P is added to everyone’s commitment store. If
anyone  disagrees,  then  they  must  explicitly  deny  P.  Such  a  condition  gives
expression to the notion that we mostly believe what people say. A participant’s
commitment store does not have to be logically consistent. Its logical consistency
becomes an issue only if the other participants in the dialogue detect prima face
logical inconsistency and demand that the inconsistency be resolved. We return to
the question of prima face inconsistency later.
The fourth element is a set of Interaction Rules to stipulate the legal sequence of
locution events. For example, a question of the form “Why do you believe that P ?”
must be followed by the reasons, or premises, from which one is to draw the
conclusion that P, or a denial that one believes that P. These rules immediately
make the dialogue into a joint activity. Breach of the rules indicates a failure in
the joint activity. A joint activity need not be a co-operative activity. It can be
competitive.  For example,  it  can be mutually  counter-persuasive,  where each
participant is  trying to persuade the other of  a proposition contrary to their
present belief.
We set out some of the rules for the dialogue-logic, DL3 (Girle 1997), which is
based on the systems DL (Girle 1993), DL2 (Girle 1994), and BQD (Mackenzie
1979, 1984). For DL3 there are just twoparticipants, X and Y. In setting out rules
below we will use S for the speaker and H for the hearer. There are nine sorts of
locutions  allowed:  statements  of  three  kinds,  declarations,  withdrawals,  tf-
questions,  wh-questions,  challenges,  and  resolution  demands.
* The categorical statements are statements such as P, not P, P and Q, P or Q, If P
then Q and statements of ignorance (I do not know whether or not P). The last is
abbreviated  to  \(*i  P.*  The  reactive  statements  are  grounds  (Because  P),
abbreviated toP.
* The logical statements are immediate consequence conditionals such as: If P
and P implies Q, then Q.
* A term declaration is the utterance of some term, say t.
* The withdrawal of P is of the form I withdraw P, I do not accept P, not P, or I no
longer know whether P. The first and second are abbreviated as \(mi P.
* The tf-questions are of the form Is it the case that P?, abbreviated to P ?.
* The wh-questions are of the form What (when, where, who, what, which) is an
(the) F ?. The strict logical form is (Qx)Fx, where Q is the interrogative quantifier,
and  for  each  such  formula  there  will  be  an  associated  statement  (Ex)Fx.
(Mackenzie 1987)
* A challenge is of the form Why is it supposed to be that P?, abbreviated to Why
P?.
* The resolution demands are of the form Resolve P.
Each locution event is represented in the formal representation of a dialogue in
an ordered triple of a number, an agent and the agent’s locution. The number is
the number of an event in the dialogue sequence. For example, the statement P
uttered at the nth step in the dialogue by X is represented as X, P. We also allow
for justification sequences. They are four-tuples consisting of the antecedent of a
conditional, the conditional, its consequent, and a challenge of the consequent.
For example: If P then Q, Q, Why Q? We set out some of the rules of DL3, with
comments on their significance and operation.
There are seven Commitment Store Rules. We set out three:
(C1)  Statements  :  After  an  event  S,  P,  where  P  is  a  statement,  unless  the
preceding event was a challenge, P goes into the commitment stores of both
participants.
(It is assumed that everyone agrees with statements unless and until they deny
them or withdraw them. The inclusion of the full ordered pair is so that there is a
record in the commitment store of thehistorical order of the locutions included.)
(C2) Defences : After the event S, P, when: Why Q? and Q are in the speaker’s
commitment store, the justification sequence : If P then Q, Q, Why Q?, and P and
If P then Q go into the commitment stores of both participants.
The  challenge:  Why  Q?  is  removed  from  the  commitment  stores  of  both
participants.
(If  someone  gives  reasons  for  a  statement  Q,  then  the  reason,  its  assumed
conditional  connection,  and exactly  what  is  justified go into the commitment
stores of both participants. This allows us to keep track of why statements are in
the commitment stores.)
(C4) Challenges : After the event S, Why P?, the challenge, Why P?, goes into the
commitment stores of both participants.
If  P  is  not  in  the hearer’s  commitment store then:  P goes into the hearer’s
commitment store.
If P is in the speaker’s commitment store, it is removed.
If the P is present in the speaker’s commitment store as part of a justification
sequence, the justification sequence is removed.
(Although it might seem strange to put P into the hearer’s commitment store, the
hearer can withdraw it or deny it (see (v)(a) below and C3 above).
Also, if P is in the speaker’s commitment store it is withdrawn because, if the
speaker has no problem about the statement, the challenge should not have been
issued.  It  should  be  noted  that  this  is  not  an  altogether  unproblematic
explanation. The speaker might want to discern whther or not the hearer has
reasons for asserting P other than the speaker’s.
Further details of other Commitment Store rules are set out in the table below.
There  are  eight  Interaction  Rules.  We  set  out  five  in  detail.  The  rest  are
summarised, in some sense, in the table below.
(i) Repstat : No statement may occur if it is in the commitment stores of both
participants.
This rule prevents vain repetition and helps stop begging the question. From an
everyday rhetorical perspective it is unrealistic, but in the ideal dialogue it is
appropriate.
(ii) Imcon : A conditional whose consequent is an immediate consequence of its
antecedent must not be withdrawn.
(iii) LogChall : An immediate consequence conditional must not be withdrawn.
(These  rules,  (ii)  and  (iii),  prevent  the  withdrawal  or  challenge  of  logical
principles. These are the focus of our attention later in this paper.)
(v) Chall : After S, Why P? the next event must be , H, Q, where Q is either
(a) a withdrawal or denial of P, or
(b)  the  resolution  demand  of  an  immediate  consequence  conditional  whose
consequent is P and whose antecedent is a conjunction of the statements to which
the challenger is committed, or
(c) a statement of grounds acceptable to the challenger.
We require, at this point, a definition of what an acceptable statement of grounds
is: A statement of grounds, Because P, is acceptable to participant S iff either P is
not under challenge by S, or if P is under challenge by S then there is a set of
statements to each of which S is committed and to none of which is S committed
to challenge, and P is an immediate modus ponens consequence of the set. This
definition is discussed at length in Mackenzie [1984]. (When the challenge is
issued, the person challenged can either (a) deny any adherence to P, or (b) throw
the  challenge  back  to  the  challenger  by  pointing  out  that  the  challenger  is
committed to P, or (c) give a reason acceptable to the challenger).
S Locution at Step n S Store H Store
H Response
 S Locution at Step n S Store H Store H Response
(vi) Resolve : The resolution demand in S, Resolve whether P can occur only if
either
(a)  P  is  a  statement  or  conjunction  of  statements  which  is  immediately
inconsistent and to which its hearer is committed, or
(b) P is of the form If Q then R and Q is a conjunction of statements to all of which
its hearer is committed, and R is an immediate
consequence of Q, and the previous event was either , H, I withdraw P or , H, Why
R? (The rule above opens the way for keeping statements consistent).
We set out the key points in a Rule Operation Table. There are rows for each of
the speaker’s,  S, locutions. There are two commitment store columns for the
resultant entries to the speaker’s, S, and hearer’s, H, commitment stores. We use
plus  and  minus  to  indicate  what  is  being  added  to  or  subtracted  from the
commitment stores of speaker and hearer. There is a column for any required
next locution from the hearer.
There are three points to note.
First, commitment stores contain much more than just categorical statements.
They contain relevant portions of the dialogue content. Questions and challenges
are important parts of that content.
Second, a participant’s commitment store does not have to be logically consistent.
Its logical consistency becomes an issue only
if the other participants in the dialogue detect prima face logical inconsistency
and demand that the inconsistency be resolved.
Third, some of the allowed responses are more complex than can be fitted into the
box in the table. Detail will be found in (Girle
1997).
The table shows constraints the logic imposes on a dialogue.  They impose a
discipline, but can allow utterly inconsequential debates (see Stewart-Zerba and
Girle 1993).
3. The Disjunctive Syllogism Debate
There is  a  well  known classical  principle  called ex falso quodlibet  (Anything
follows from a contradiction).
((P & – P) – Q)




A great deal of ink has been expended by non-classical logicians in arguing that
Disjunctive Syllogism is not valid. The argument nearly always begins with the
standard proof of ex falso quodlibet. It is argued that ex falso quodlibet is invalid,
and that Disjunctive Syllogism is sufficient to enable the proof to go through. So,
something is seriously wrong with Disjunctive Syllogism.
The standard proof is as follows:
** 1. (P & -P) Assumption
* 2. P 1, Simplification
* 3. (P V Q) 2, Addition
* 4. -P 1, Simplification
* 5. Q 3, 4, Disjunctive Syllogism
6. ((P & -P) – Q) 1 – 5, CP
Step 5 is supposedly the key.
Even though it is clear that Disjunctive Syllogism is not alone sufficient for ex
falso  quodlibet,  and  even  though  some  might  argue  that  Addition  is  more
questionable, that is not the point of what is to be considered here. It does not
matter which step we take to be the most vulnerable, any will do. If we agree that
there is a “bad step” somewhere, we can look at each of them. And in each case
we have a real problem on our hands.
John Woods has used the dialogue logic set out above to show that we can hardly
begin to debate this situation.
The Rule is:
(vii) Resolution : After the event S, Resolve whether P the next event must be , H,
Q, where Q is either
(a) the withdrawal of one of the conjuncts of P, or
(b) the withdrawal of one of the conjuncts of the antecedent of P, or
(c) a statement of the consequent of P.
(a) does not apply, because the statement at issue is a conditional. As for (b), R is
not able to withdraw any of the conjuncts of the antecedent without, eventually,
have to repudiate the whole proof. As for (c), R will be forced acknowledge that Q.
It might be asked, “Why does R not withdraw or deny the conditional: If (P V Q)
and – P, then Q ?”
The reason is that the conditional is an immediate consequence conditional. And
there are two crucial Rules concerning such conditionals:
(ii) Imcon : A conditional whose consequent is an immediate consequence of its
antecedent must not be withdrawn.
(iii) LogChall : An immediate consequence conditional must not be withdrawn.
John Woods  points  out:  We might  think  that  the  dispute  now moves  to  the
question of whether DS is a principle of logic. That is not an askable challenge
until it is established that DS is not a rule of logic. Girle’s rules oblige us not to
challenge DS unless it is invalid.
But its invalidity is precisely what [the participants] are deadlocked over. The
present  result  easily  generalizes.  DL3 is  unable  to  resolve any disagreement




Priest and Mackenzie point out that the Rules Imcon and LogChall give effect to a
priori  rules and principles.  The immediate consequence conditionals to which
they refer are conditionals which give effect to rules and principles which must be
arrived at  by some a priori  method.  If  the method is  classical,  then we get
Disjunctive Syllogism and ex falso quodlibet for free, no matter whether we want
them or not. If the method is non-classical, then we don’t get them. If the debate
is between classical and non-classical logicians, questions are begged.
Priest and Mackenzie suggest that to deal with questions such as the question of
what counts as a valid principle we should shift to a posteriori Rules. In other
words, we should note what principles are accepted by people, or used by people
in argument. These should become our principles.
In an a posteriori investigation, the immediate conditionals are simply a set of
statements priveledged in the dialogue; and as such, they need not be regarded
as logically valid by logicians, and it is even possible that they need not all be in
conditional form. Equally, from this point of view an immediate inconsistency is
simply a set of statements whose acceptance renders one liable to a resolution
demand without further ado.
There is an immediate objection to this suggestion. The classicalist  may well
disagree with the “empirical” approach. We are trying to settle what the a priori
Rules are. To move to a posteriori Rules pre-empts the debate, or shifts us to a
different debate. There is really no direct way through this sort of objection.
We might suggest negotiations of some sort.  Can a subset of valid argument
schemas be agreed to, and those used for immediate consequence conditionals?
To such a suggestion it might be responded that we can hardly settle questions of
truth and necessity by negotiation. Of course, it is not only the classical logician
who can play this game.
The sub-set of valid arguments is hardly likely to include any argument schemas
unacceptable  to  the  non-classical  logician.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  that
suggestion can be seen as a non-classical ploy.
5. True Contradictions
The problems with Disjunctive Syllogism fade into the background when we turn
to one of the main doctrines of dialethicism. The claim is that some contradictions
are true. They are, of course, also false. But the second value is no problem.
In particular, the traditional “paradoxes” of set theory are seen as the facts about
set theory. The paradoxes are presented in (Priest 1995) as indelible signs that we
have reached the limits of thought. True contradictions in set theory, philosophy,
language, and many other areas of intellectual endeavour, show us that we are at
the limits of thought, and of course, beyond the limits also.
John Woods presents the usual argument from set theory in terms of dialogue
logic, and argues that the classical dialogue logic shows that the Russell set just
does not exist.
We will not translate Woods’ inimitable account into the formalities of dialogue
logic. That task is left to the reader. We simply reproduce Woods’ version of what
he calls “Frege’s Sorrow”. Russell is S and Frege is H.
1. S: If R (the set of all non-self-membered sets) exists then R is a member of R
and R is not a member of R.
2. H: Yes.
3. S: By the axioms we both accept, R exists.
4. H: Agreed.
5. S: So we’re in trouble.
6. H: You can say that again.
7. S: Since our resolution rules tell us to drop a conjunct if a statement in our
committment store is an immediate contradiction, let’s drop “R is a member of R”.
8. H: But there is also a rule about honouring immediate consequences of what’s
left, i.e., “R is not a memeber of R”. The trouble is that “R is not a member of R”
immediately restores “R ia a member of R”;  and we’re right back where we
started.
9.  S:  Worse still,  the rules drive us into and endless cycle of  resolution and
paradox rebirth.
10. H: Of course, there is no prospect under the rules of wriggling out of Excluded
Middle, is there?
11. S: No; it’s a principle of logic.
12. H: But look, S. You’ve shown that if R exists then R is a member of R and R is
not a memeber of R.
13. S: Unfortunately.
14. H: Now the consequent of that conditional is a logical falsehood, n’est ce pas.
15. S: Yes, and of course its negation is a logical truth.
16. H: Right, AND we can’t give up that logical truth and we can’t give up your
fateful conditional.
17. S: Nor can we give up modus tollens, another principle of logic.
18. H: Which, together with the conditional and our logical truth produces as an
immediate consequence the negation of its antecedent.
19. S: You mean, that R doesn’t exist, after all?
20. H: Yip.
21. S: So arithmetic isn’t toppling?
22. H: Yip
So  ends  the  Woods  dialogue.  But,  for  the  dialethicist,  steps  10  and  11  are
problematic,  obviously.  Priest  would  want  to  say  that  we  should  accept  the
consequences of our argument: R is a member of R and R is not a member of R.
Since the premises were true, both conjuncts of the feared conjunction are true
also. If you believe that true premises and valid argument give true conclusions,
then believe also that the contradiction is true.
But, for us the question becomes: How can we debate the status of excluded
middle, and the truth of contradictions? We are, essentially, in the same situation
as we were with Disjunctive Syllogism.
6. Conclusion
It looks as though the debate ceases, unless classical logicians are prepared to
give way, and in that case the debate ceases anyway.
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